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FEDERAL INCORPORATION
II.

W

E have traced in the foregoing part the prindpal cases bearing directly upon the federal power of incorporation. To
gain a just perspective of the attitude the court may take
upon the constitutionality of an act requiring uniform federal incorporation of all businesses engaged in interstate commerce it is
necessary to complete our review by an examination of the tren~
of the court's decisions involving other portions of the field of commerce regulation. The construction placed upon acts exerting other
forms of regulation will not be so conclusive to our inquiry as the
adjudication of the cases reviewed in the foregoing section, but by
exhibiting the general trend of the judicial reasoning upon the
subject of the commercial power it will provide us with a wider
basis of judgment. We shall first ex~ine the development of the
Congressional control over foreign commerce, and following, its regulation of the various instrumentalities and objects of interstate
commerce.
From the earliest period of our constitutional development the
power of Congress over foreign commerce has been held complete
and unlimited within the field upon which it operates. The full extent of the power was relied upon by the act of Congress of December 22, 18o7, whereby an embargo was laid upon all sea-going vessels then in ports or harbors of the United States. No act of regulation of commerce could be more drastic. Its practical effect was a
prohibition of all foreign commerce and that was the effect contemplated by the Congress which enacted it. Yet its constitutionality
was never questioned before the Supreme Court of the United
States. The only adjudication upon the constitutional validity of
the law came from the United States District Court of Massachusetts in the case of the United States v. The William. 1 In a long and
able opinion in that case Judge Davis set forth very clearly the nature and scope of the regulatory power in Congress over foreign
commerce. He regarded it from the lofty view point of national
interests. The argument had been advanced, he said, that the "Power to regulate * * * cannot be understood to give a power to
annihilate."*** "Let this be admitted," he answered, "and are they
(Congress) not at liberty to consider the present prohibitory system as necessary and proper to an eventual beneficial regulation?
128 Fed. Cases 614.

MICHIGAN--LAW REVIEW _ _

~-

·

On the abstract question of constitutional power I see nothing to
prohibit or restrain the measure."
.
"Further,'' the learned. judge continues, "the power to regulate
commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of measures exclusively ·beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its advancement;
but, in our national system * * * it is also to be considered as an instrument for other purposes of general policy and interest." "The
situation of the United States, in ordinary times, might render legislative interferences, relative to commerce, less necessary; but the
capacity and power of managing and directing it, for the advancement of great national purposes seems an important ingredient of
sovereignty."2 Words such as these;: must give heart to those who
see in the Constitution not a rigid code of law but a declaration of
guiding principles and a provision of forms and means of -organized
authority which· are intended to serve rather than to shackle the
growth of a great nation. It is true this opinion did not emanate
from the highest tribunal to which is entrusted the interpretation of
the Constitution. But it was never overthrown by that court; and
that it should have been acquiesced in immediately is some evidence
that it was prevalently i:egarded as sound.
This broad construction was placed upon the Constitutional control over foreign commerce in 18o8. Not until 1903 by a case involving tariff legislation was the extent of that power again called
in question. An Act of Congress of March 2, 1897, provided for
standardizing, by administrative determination, the quality of teas
imported. In the case of Buttfield v. Stranahau3 the plaintiff had attempted to introduce a grade in-ferior to that permitted by the official regulations. It was seized and destroyed. The court in deciding
against the plaintiff declared: ''As a result of the complete power of
Congress over foreign commerce, it necessarily follows that no in- ·
dividual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations which is so
broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of Congress to
determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into this
country arid the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised." The court concluded:- "It results that a statute which restrains -the introduction of particular goods info the-United States
from considerations of public policy does not violate the "due process" clause of the Constitution." It is clear from this decision that
the court has not renounced the broad construction put upon the
=It must be kept in mind that these words were used respecting authority ewer
extraterritorial and not inte~ trade. Comment upon this impoitmt disUndion -.ill
be found, infra, p. 150. et seq.
3 192
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commerce power in the early case of the United States v. The William and since theu generally accepted:' It affirms and gives the
highest sanction to that view of the commerce power which henceforth may be taken as incontestable with regard to foreign intercourse.
Congress exercised its authority in a more restricted field by forbidding the importation of opium in an Act of February 9, 1909.
In conformity with the trend of the decisions already mentioned it
was held in Brolan v. U11itcd .'>'tales that it was "frivolous to question the power of Congress to prohibit importations."
It appears then that Congr<.>ss may exercise this power not only
for the purpose of conserving the health, comfort, safety, and morals
of the people, but for the purpose of public policy, to promote trade
in certain quarters, to favor certain lines of industry to the detriment of others. And further it appears that for those purposes it
may use what means it deems best fitted for their attainment even
to absolute prohibition, providing only 0 that the restriction operates
equally upon all who are engaged, or who attempt to engage, in the
business so regulated. This is the ground upon which all tariff acts
from the first slightly protective measures of 17897 to the present
day have been tacitly supported by the adjudication of cases involving their specific provisions,8 since the power to levy duties and tolls
as such presumably does not extend beyond what is necessary for
revenue purposes.0
The control exercised by Congress over immigration tho resting
at least in part upon its power to regulate foreign commerce need
hardly attract our detailed attention, since it has generally been held
· by the court to be "an incident of sovereignty" springing from the
•An interesting case involving the authority of Congress over foreign commerce was
presented in The Abbey Dodge (223 U. S. 166). The vessel had been employed in
gathering sponges during a certain period within a prescribed area in the Gulf of Mex·
ico in violation of an act of Congress. The court said: "the vessel was engaged in .foreign commerce and was therefore amenable to the regulating power of . Congress over
that subject.*** The practices from the beginning, sanctioned by the decisions of ·
this court establish that Congress by an exertion of its power to regulate foreign com·
merce has the authority to forbid merchandise carried in such commerce from entering
the United States". The parallelism between the manner of e.xercising control over this
extra-territorial industry and that attempted by the federal child-labor law over mining
and manufacturing industries is striking.
•Calvert: "The Regulation of Commerce". pp. 44, 52.
~Bogart: "Economic History of the United States", pp. II7·II8.
Taussig: "Tariff History of the United States", pp. r4-r5.
•Soloman v. Artliur, 102 U. S. 208; American Net & Twine Co. v. U'ortlti11glo11,
141 U. S. 468; Ben..--inger v. U. S., 192 U. S. 38.
9
That tariff legislation combines power to regulate commerce and taxing power, see
Freund: "Police Power", p. 63.
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very fact of the unity of the United States in the face of any fo~
eign state or power. Such is the doctrine expressed by ·Justice
Gray in the authoritative case of' Fong Ytt Ting v. The United
States.10 In that opinion all the cases upon right of entrance «?f
_aliens are collated, together with an elaborate review of the commentaries and authorities. The court declared that: "The right to exclude or expel all alien~, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon
certain conditions, in war or in peace" is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to
its safety, its independence and its welfare.» That it is in principle
distinct from and independent of the right to regulate foreign commerce would seem to flow directly from "the course of adjudication
of all the oriental immigration cases.11
It must be concluded that while the course of adjudication of
cases involving the Congressional power over foreign commerce certainly recognizes a "full and complete" power in Congress extending even to absolute and universal prohibition on grounds solely of
public policy, it furnishes no secure foundation for the same construction of the power to regulate interstate commerce. In the for. mer sphere Congress is exercising a power which is affected with,
when it is not integrally combined with, its sovereign power of governing our political relations with foreign nations~ In the latter
sphere the exercise of its power of regulation touches the powers and
rights of the constituent states to which it bears a strict constitutional relationship and which have a residual if not a reciprocal control in
our constitutional system.12 The limitation that this latter fact involves cannot be too strenuously insisted upon, for the Supreme
Court "itself has upon more than one occa.Sion13 let slip remarks in
obiter dicta identifying the extent and character of the two powers.
10 149
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line of cleavage had also been previously intimated in PeGple v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique (107 U. S. 59) if. indeed, the decision of thaf case did not
im-olve this distinction. And in the more recent decision of Oce1111ic Narigation Com·
pan;s v. Stranahan (214 U. S.- 342) the court in sustaining the Act of Congress of March
3, 1903, establishing rigorous health standards for :ill= immigrants and imposllig some
really burdensome duties and liabilities upon steamshlp companies in order to proride
a thorough enforcement of the law fully accepts ariii rcaflinns the above principle. It
declared: "Iu effect, all the contentions p(CSSCd in argument concerning tbe r<:pll8tJ3Dcy
, of the statute to the due -process clause really disregard the complete and absolute power
of Congress over the subject with which the statute deals...
""This view is expressed hy C. J. Fuller in the diss=ting opinion in the LD'lfcry
case, 188 U. S. 373-374. It ~ of course. upon the toth Amendment.
:u Gibbons v. Ogdrn, 9 \Vb.eat. 187; Tlie Lottery Case. 288 U. S. 321: Cnzfdizr ,,••
Ke11t11cky, 241 lJ. S. 471. In tbese opinions the control m-cr intcrst:ite comm= is
declared to be upon the same plane as that over foreign commerce. though in neither
case was the latter power in question.
11 The
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The opinions in Buttfirld v. Stranahan14 and Brolan v. The United
however negative that assumption.
But although the two powers are theoretically and logically separable, on account of the difference in the respective spheres in
which they operate,1° so that the power to regulate interstate commerce cannot be construed in reason and has not been interpreted
in law to extend to an absolute and universal prohibition, there are
none the less very good and sound reasons why it may be construed
to extend to such regulation as is based not strictly upon the police
power in the sense of health, morals, safety, sanitation measures17
but upon grounds of public policy. This view has already been stated most succinctly in an opinion by· Judge ROGERS in the United
States Circuit Court.18 He says, speaking of the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce: "the commerce power is plenary,
is not confined or limited by the scope of the ordinary police powers
as they are exercised by the state, but is restrained and limited only
by the Constitution itself." There would seem to be no basis in
reason or in the accepted tenets of constitutional construction why
the regulatory power over interstate commerce which is granted in
the same clause of the Constitution and in the same terms as the
regulatory power over foreign commerce should not be interpreted
to extend thus far, even though the peculiar relation of the latter to
the sovereign power to govern foreign relations may make it effective still further. It is, on the other hand, a powerful argument in
favor of such a construction upon the the power to regulate interstate commerce. If one of two powers, each of which is granted in
the same terms, is absolute, it furnishes an excellent presumption that
the other is not narrowly relative, but relative only to the most fundamental principles of polity and of justice.
Of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce the first to receive
the attention of Congress was the famous Cumberland Road ;10 but
States~

u. s.

.. 19"
492.
"236 U. S. 216; where it is laid down that: "The very postulate upon which the

antltority of Congress to absolutely prohibit foreign importations as expounded by the
decisions of this court rests is the broad distinction between the two powers."
See Prentice: ''The Federal Power over Carriers and Corporations", p. 147; and
Judson: "The Law of Interstate Commerce", pp. 5-6.
u Cakert: "Regulation of Commerce", pp. 52-53 is skeptical about this. But Heisler
"Federal Incorporation" argues in favor of such a construction of the power, at least
by necessary implication (pp. 62-69).
18 The citation has been lost; but see for statements similar though not quite so spe·
cific: Slicrfock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99, 103 (by Justice Field); Emploscrs' Lial•ility Cases,
207 U. S. 526 (dissenting opinion by Justice Moody); Seco11d Emplo;,ocrs' Lial•. Cases,
223 U. S. 47, (in opinion by Justice VanDevanter, points "3" and "4".
"'Provided for by Act of March 29, 1806; U. S. Stat. at Large JI, 357. The road
was constructed and kept in repair by federal agents and from frderal appropriations.

1•
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the nrst adjudication of the extent of federal control came in a controversy over the respective powers of the state and national Govern·
ments concerning the navigation of waters within the territorial
limits of a state. In Gibbons v. Ogden20 the right of a state to grant
an exclusive privilege to operate steamboats in the navigable waters
lying within its boundaries was denied by the Supreme Court. In
the course of a painstaking analysis of the extent and character of
the commerce power the court said: "It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.
No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any
foreign nation to which this power does not extend. It has been
truly said that 'commerce' as this word is used in the Constitution
is a unit every part of which is indicated by the term. If this be
the admitted meaning of the word in its application to foreign nations it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence and
remain a unit, unless there be some plain, intelligible cause which
alters it."
The court found no such "plain, intelligible cause" and so held
that the states had no power to grant exclusive franchises in this
field reserved to the control of Congress.. -But if the states can
grant no exclusive franchises to engage in foreign or interstate
commerce then on what ground are special franchises from states
to engage in that trade upheld? The difference is that exclusive
franchises are a hindrance and burden while special or corporate
franchises have tended, during a certain period, to promote the
growth and prosperity of that commerce. In the former case it
could not in reason be held that such a franchise might be operative
until Congress took direct adverse action; in the latter case the.view
might be taken that the-silence of Congress is a permission that fran'.:"
chises and corporate liabilities acquired under state action may be
operative until Congress takes some positive action to exercise in
a similar manner its paramount authority. This is because in the former case the state action is quite inconsistent with any construction that might be put upon the inaction of Congress, whereas in
the latter case state action operating up to a point to facilitate rather
than to obstruct the course of commerce iS interpreted as concurrent
w the "negative action" of Congress and conformable to its will.
The incapacity of the states_ to grant e..xclusive franchises, then, rel:nive to the participation in interstate and foreign commerce, is
The consent of the states through which the road passed was expressly required by the
'"rms of the Act.
"'9 Wheat. I.
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strong evidence of the contingency of their right to grant any franchises exercisable in interstate commerce.
The principle of Gibbons v. Ogden was somewhat modified by
subsequent cases21 so that the net development before the Civil War
of the law concerning interstate ferriage may be stated as follows:
the entire subject of rules and regulations for its conduct was considered of a local nature and under the concurrent, perhaps exclusive, control of the states so long as no obstructions were placed upon interstate communication. The second stage in the growth of
the federal power over the subject is illustrated by the case of the
Gloucester Ferry Compawy v. Pcmisylvania. 22 In this case a state
attempted to tax a foreign ferriage corporation whose boats in the
regular course of business touched at wharves within its jurisdiction. The state was denied the power so to tax these instruments
of interstate commerce upon the ground that it might operate to
impose discriminatory burdens upon that commerce. But it was
still maintained that the states under their police powers might make
all needful regulations for navigation, even requiring licenses where
no tax was connected with the same.
A third stage in the development of the law governing the operation of interstate ferries was foreshadowed by the decision in St.
Clair v. Interstate Transfer Compawy. 23 It was there held that a
state could not require a license for railroad transports, which were
distinguished from ferries, 24 notwithstanding the fact that no pecuniary burden was placed upon a licensee, since these boats were
in effect parts of an interstate transportation system in a general
rather than a merely local sense. In New York Central Railroad
Compa11y v. Hudson Coimty25 the problem was definitively settled by
·an e.xtension of the federal power over the whole subject. In substance, the court has come in these cases to reinterpret the silence
of Congress in the matter of licenses or its indirect action26 in the
matter of tolls as evidence of its will to have complete and exclusive
control.
It will be recognized from this line of cases that there has been
a steady e>.."Pansion of the federal power over ferries plying across
state boundaries which has been in harmony with the change in the
%1.Fanr.ing v. Gregoire,

16 How. 524; Conway v. Taylor, l Black. 603.
This case follows St. Louis v. Tlie Ferry Company, 1 t \Vall. 423,
and lViggins Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365

""u4 U. S. 196.
""192

=•As
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a lower court had ruled in New York v. New England Transfer Co., Fed.

Cases No. 10, 197.
::?$ =7 u. s. 248.
""The court refers to the provisions of the Interst. Com. Act of 1SE'7.

actual objective conditions. In the early days, or the period preceding the immense development of production- for interstate markets
and a vast network of steam transportation systems, state control
of ferries operating across rivers bounding states was not only justifiable but positively more propitious for the extension of such communication than federal regulation on account of the local character and limited scope of the business. But when presently the diversity in regulation and the want of uniformity in service touched
the movement of a greatly augmented interstate commerce so closely
as to threaten an appreciable obstruction to that commerce, it became necessary to hold that the interference of Congress in a portion of the field displaced by so much the effective range of state
regulation. Finally when the interstate commerce had assumed eveti
larger proportions and ferries had become parts of more intricate
lines of communication the power of control ~ver interstate ferriage
was adjudged complete and exclusive in Congress.
Bridges connecting points in the different states were in the early
decades of our history constructed and operated under the supervision of the states, sometimes acting severally, sometimes jointly.
As early as the '40s _and '50s however, Congress began to take account of its authority over these structures. Its initial step was perhaps a somewhat impolitic one, but it served nevertheless to confirm the power. The Supreme Court in 1851 had held27 that the
Wheeling Bridge across the Ohio River erected under authority of
the state of Virginia was a public iiuisance28 in that it .constituted a
material obstruction to the navigation of the river. Congress-was
prevailed upon the ·following year to recognize the bridge as a lawful structure. The court in declaring-29 this act constitutional, therefore, was compelled to hold in effect that the power of Congress
was so exhaustive in this field that it might declare that not to be a
nuisance which the highest judicial tribunal in the country had declared was such. Relative to the consequences· of the act of Congress the court by Mr. Justice N:itr.soN said: "It will not do to say
that the exercise of an admitted power of Congres5 conferred by
the Constitution is to be withheld if it appears or can be shown that
"' 13 Howard 519.
""There were several 1>ackets ·regularly plying past Wheeling which could not pass
under the span without undergoing expensive alterations and being subject to a continuing burden as long as they operated. It seems pretty clear, moreover, that one of the
principal motives for the construction of the bridge was to make Wheeling the liead of
na,igation on the Ohio, and thus cut off the trade of 'rations Pennsylvania cities. particularly Pittsburgh.
"" 18 Howard 421.
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the effect and operation of the law may incidentally extend beyond
the limitation of the power."
In the case of the Newport B1·idge Compan'j' v. The United
States3° it is affirmed that the control of Congress over bridges between two states is paramount, and that state charters for the construction of such bridges operate by suffrance to this extent: that
Congress may regulate, prescribe new requirements, or entirely annul the exercise of franchise rights, whenever such measures are
deemed "essential to secure the due protection to the navigation of
the river''. The bridge company had been incorporated by special
legislative enactments of Ohio and Kentucky which empowered it
to build the- bridge across the Ohio according to certain specifications, but subjected it to such additional requirements as Congress
might make. By special acts of 1869 and 1871 Congress twice
changed the requirements in respect to span and headway as it had
reserved the right to do, but in the latter act it was provided that
the United States might be sued in equity for damages caused by the
alterations. After the erection of the bridge according to the approved plans the company brought its action for indemnification,
which was denied. The court said, "The paramount power of regu1ating bridges that affect the navigation of navigable rivers of the
United States is in Congress. * * * But when power ~vas given to
build this bridge it was deemed expedient in the interest of commerce to be more specific, and by reserving the power to withdraw
the assent of Congress to what might prove to be an obstruction to
navigation, to imply· at least a reservation of power to make that
unlawfu1 which, while the assent continued, would be lawful." "* * *
the (Congressional) resolution of 1869 became*** the paramount
license for the construction and maintenance of the bridge, and the
Company by accepting its provisions became subject to all the limitations and reservations of power which Congress saw fit to impose". "The action of Congress is supreme and overrides all the
states may do". Herein is -contained the essential guarantee that the
power of Congress is not merely negative. It is a full, complete,
positive power,31-power to direct that commerce by the enactment
of laws tending to effectuate ends which are deemed desirable for
the general well-being. It is not only the power to determine what
is injurious and obstructive to the movement of interstate commerce and to remove or counteract such hindrances. It is the power
to determine the manner in which the instruments of interstate traf"" 105
•1

u. s. 470.

See also S. Carolina v. Georgia decided shortly previous, 93 U. S. +

154

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

fie shall be constructed and operated according as expediency ~d
public policy seem to point the way.
..
The full significance of this doctrine can only be understood in
conjunction with the view expressed in the dissenting opinion by
Justice Field. He said : "Its regulation (that pf foreign and interstate commerce) therefore required such control over our harbors,
bays and navigable streams * * * as might be necessary to keep navi-gation free from mmecessary obstructions,..::i2 and might legitimately
extend to making such improvements as would facilitate the passage
of vessels, render their anchorage safe, etc. * * * to this extent its
power over navigable waters goes under the commerce clause; no
further. Unless therefore the free navigation of the public waters
is impeded by what a state may do or permit, Congress cannot interfere with its action***."
It was this view-this very limited and restricted view-which the
majority of the court flatly repudiated. The vigor of statement and
cogency of reasoning of the decisions in which the earlier tradition
of the commerce power had been set forth were apparently too
great to admit of departure from their unmistakable spirit. The
clear distinction between the majority and minority views makes
this case a singularly important landmark in the development of constitutional interpretation, coming as it did at a critical juncture.
After the Civil War had worked out such a radical disturbance in
the relative positions of the states and the federal authority in our
scheme Qf government there opened up a new field for constitutional
construction. The three new amendments offered great possibilities
for constructive statesmanship, through the medium of juristic interpretation. But there was none to take the place of Hamilton, or
of Marshall, or of Webster. The trend of constitutfonal interpretation viewed in its larger aspects was for some time directly away
from the earlier tradition. The persistent course was toward preserving the rights and powers of the states so far as might be reasonably compatible with constitutional provisions.
In view of this recognized fact the importance of the decision in
the Newport Bridge case becomes cleare.r. In a period when a large
part of the field of organic law was being sensibly modified and shaded by the obscure influence of judicial preconceptions and sympathies
of a slightly different blend, the original traditions of the scope and
nature of the power over interstate and foreign commerce were preserved. At least this constitutional provision escaped a construction which would have emasculated it so far as positive, constructive direction and control by Congress is concerned.
., Italics those of the present writer.

FEDERAL INCORPORATION

155

The effect of the decisions in Gibson v. United States33 and in
Scranton v. Whceler, 2 • which involved the question of interference
with riparian rights by the constructio~ of dikes and piers for the
improvement of navigation, was to continue and to re-enforce the
view of the regulatory power of Congress adopted in the Newport
Bridge case. The positive and comprehensive character of the power is reaffirmed, at least insofar as the power relates to the control
over navigation. It is not confined to a merely supervisory function
to provide against actual obstructions and the removal of nuisances,
in short, to keep the navigable streams.which are the paths of interstate commerce unclogged. It extends to whatever action Congress
may judge-to-be 1nthe public interest and tending to facilitate themovement of interstate commerce upon navigable streams.
The Union Bridge case35 called into question the validity of an· Act
of Congress known as The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which
declared that any bridge or structure causing an unreasonable obstruction to interstate commerce upon navigable streams should, upon determination of the £.act by the Secretary of War, be altered or
remodelled in such a way as might be prescribed by the Secretary
of War, or entirely removed so as to permit reasonably free, unobstructed navigation. Under the authority of this act the Union
Bridge spanning the Alleghany River at Pittsburgh was condemned.
The court, holding the act to be within the power of Congress to
regulate an integral part of interstate commerce declared: "Although
the bridge, when erected under the authority of a Pennsylvania
charter, may have been a lawful structure, and although it may not
have been an unreasonable obstruction to commerce and navigation .
as then carried on, it must be taken, under the cases cited and on
principle,' not only that the. company when exerting the power conferred upon it by the state, did so with knowledge of the paramount
authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the states, but
that it erected the bridge subject to the possibility that Congress at
some future time, when the public demanded, exert its power by appropriate legislation to protect navigation against unreasonable obstruction." To similar effect in Louisville Bridge Company v. United Statcs3 6 it was decided that even a bridge erected under CongressiOnal sanction without any reservation of power to require alterations and designated as a "lawful bridge" might subsequently be condemned, and not upon the ground of being a dangerous structure,
.. 166
"' 179
""204
""242

u. s. 269.
u. s. 141.
u. s. 364.
u. s. 409.
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but solely upon the ground of being a present obstruction to navigation. It was stated that: "the Acts of 1862 and 1865 (under which
the bridge was constructed) conferred upon appellant no irrepealable
franchise to maintain its bridges precisely as it was orginally constructed."
These cases then go no farther than the N cwport case, if indeed
they go as far. For in these cases Congress made the operation of
its enactment or the action of its executive agent contingent upon
the actual existence of an unreasonable obstruction to commerce and ·
navigation. There was no evidence of such a fact nor any effort to
ascertain whether such a fact existed in the Newport case, and the
court held that an inquiry in regard to that fact was unnecessary.
Nevertheless, in another light the Union case, at least, may be regarded as an even stronger case than the Newport case, since the
Union Bridge Company was required to tear down its bridge altogether, whereas the Newport Bridge Company was only required to
make alterations.
Gilman v. Philadelphw 1 and Cardwell v. American Bridge Com-·
pany 38 involved the power of a state to authorize the construction
of bridges over navigable streams which constituted effective blocks
to steamboat transportatiori which was of a local nature, above the
points where they were constructed. In both cases the court held
that the state had the power mentioned. but only in the absence of
legislation by Congress. It was pointed out that where the regulation touched essentially local affairs, as in these cases, it would be
presumed that Congress acquiesced therein and recognized the more
favorable situation of the states for determining the best policy for
such legislation. The state would, for instance, be in a ·better position to know to what extent the community would be benefitted by
unobstructed navigation and to what extent by a connecting bridge.
This doctrine of the difference between that portion of the field
which is local in its nature and that portion which is national was
well set forth in the earlier case of Comity of Mobile v.- Kimball.38
The plaintiffs contracted with a Board of Harbor Commissioners
authorized by the Alabama legislature of 1867 to make improvements
in Mobile Bay to do a certain job of dredging, and the work being
inspected and approved but payment being refused they brought
suit. The court, holding that the state or county could not withhold
payment on the ground that the statute authori~ improvements
to be made in navigable waters was unconstitutional. said: "That
"'J

'Va!L 713.
U. S . .205.

33 IIJ

30 102

U. S.
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power (the commerce power of Congress) is indeed without limitation. It authorizes Congress to prescribe the conditions upon which
commerce in all its forms shall be conducted betw~en our citizens
and the citizens of the several states, and to adopt measures to promote its growth and insure its safety. * * * The subjects upon which
Congress can act under this power are of infinite variety, requiring
for their successful management different plans or modes of treatment. Some of them are national in their character and admit and
require uniformity of regulat~on, affecting alike all the states; others are local; or are mere aids to commerce, and can only be properly regulated by provisions adapted to their special circumstances and
localities. * * * The uniformity of commercial regulation, which the
grant to Congress was designed to secure against conflicting state
provisions, was necessarily intended only for cases where such uniformity is practicable. Where from the nature of the subject or the
sphere of its operation the case is local and limited, special regulation adapted to the immediate locality could only have been contemplated. State action'upon such subject can constitute no interference with the commercial power of Congress for when that acts
the state authority is superseded. Inaction of Congress upon these
subjects of a local nature or operation*** is (rather) to be deemed a declaration that for the time being, and until it sees fit to act,
they may be regulated by state authority."
·
It it clear from this reasoning and that of other cases 40 along the
same line, that the power of the state over these "mere aids to commerce" which are partly of a local character is not concurrent with
th_e power of Congress but exists only during the inaction of Congress. Even if we might assume the state regulations upon such a
subject to be quite adequate, tending to conserve and promote the
public interest and the commercial development of the country as a
·whole there is nothing to prevent Congress from assuming its constitutional power over the subject and rendering the state regulations inoperative.
In the Covington Bridge case41 the question for decision was
whether a state might regulate tolls over an interstate bridge con••Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299: Esca11aba etc. Co. v. Cliicago, 107 U. S.
683; Morgan v. Louisiana, u8 U. S. 455; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444;
Sands v. Manistee River Co., 123 U. S. 288, 295; Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 396,
4112; Gulf, Col. Etc. R'y v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 104; New Hat•en R. R. v. New York,
165 U. S. 628, 63z-3; M K. & T. R'y v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626; CNnpagnie Fran·
caise v. Bd. of Health, 186 U. S 380; Asbell v. K1msas, 209 U. S. 25t; Rock Island R'y
Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453; Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Mills, 2n U. S. 612; So R'y
Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 436-7; Valley S. S. Co. \'. Wottawa, 244 U. S. 202, 204.
<1 IS4 lJ S. 204.
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structed ,with the approval of Congress by a corporation chartered
jointly by that state and a sister state. The court held that the ··
whole subject o( the charges of interstate bridges rests exclusively
in Congress. In the course of its opinion the court stated: "It follows that if the state of Kentucky has the right to regulate the
travel upon such bridge and fix the tolls, the state of Ohio has the
same right. * * * Congress, and Congress alone, possesses the requisite power to harmonize such differences, and enact a uniform scale
of charges. *"* * " The principle of this case is not peculiar. . It is·
but the application of the now well-established doctrine42 that Congress has exclusive control over fares and tariffs for interstate
transportation. And it is the final correction of some of the reasoning put forth in the early ferry cases previously considered. It will
be noted that these modifications are persistently in tl\e direction of
making the power of Congress, within its constitutional field, i. e.
within the bounds of what constitutes interstate commerce, ..more
and more exhaustive, minute, and effective ..
In conclusion, it should be recognized that this entire class of
cases involving federal control over ferries and bridges between
states, while resting upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, constitute more or less a class apart
from other branches of regulation inasmuch as they concern "the
navigable waters of the United States." Such waters have from the
first been regarded as, in some sort, constituting a "natural transportation medium" for commerce among the states and with foreign nations. Moreover, the peculiar relation of the watenvays to
the national defense was not overlooked.43 For these reasons navigable watenvays have been treated as a special province for th_!!
regulating power of Congress. This is evidenced by the early delegation of manifold powers to the Secretary of vVar, reaching in several directions to the determination of minute details, with respect .
to the rules and conditions of navigation. In the execution of the
numerous 'Rivers and Harbors' acts, of which the .first of importance was passed as early as 1826, and in carrying out the provisions
.of special44 and general45 acts. conferring supervision over the location and erection of structures over navigable waters, there has developed a remarkable body of federal administrative law. Far from
militating against such a construction of the regulatory power of
., To similar effect had been the decision in the State Toum1oc Tar cases, 12 'Vall•

:•'··

.

'-' Ueport of Secretary of War, 184 H •.Doc. 18th Cong., .2nd Ses., Vol. 1, No• .2, 55.
•• Act authorizing construction of East River Bridge, .March 3, 1869.
.. Act relating to construction of bridges over Mississippi and Ohio rivers, June 4,
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Congress as would sanction its exercise in determining the conditions
upon which corporation franchises may be exercised in interstate
commerce the exertion of its power to such an extent over this portion of the field tends to give support to its exertion, when the conditions require it, in that portion with which we are herein directly
concerned.

~

The decisions covering the manner of conduct of interstate telegraph companies are singularly unsatisfactory. They exhibit a
trend of opinion decidedly hesitant or backward in comparison with
that Qf the bridge_and.. railroad ~ases with which they were declared
exactly parallel at the outset. The development of the law governing these instrumentalities of interstate commerce may be conveniently divided into four steps :
I. State laws imposing taxes in any form upon the interstate business of a telegraph company have of course been
declared invalid,-Western Union Telegraph Company v.
Te:ms.46 In that case the court took occasion to remark, "A
telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce
as a carrier of messages, that a railway company does as a
carrier of goods." It was held accordingly to fall within the
rule of: Case of the State Freight Tax,4 7 The State Tonnage
cases, 48 Passenger cases. 49
2. The cases involving more particularly state regulation
of the manner of conduct of the business, such as the transmission and delivery of interstate messages started out with
the rule that such regulation of interstate messages is void.
And apparently it would have been held invalid even for the
manner of delivery within the state of interstate messages,
for the rule was adopted upon the view that the manner of
conduct of the interstate telegraphic business is a subject requiring a uniform national rule and so exclusively within the
sphere of federal authority.50
3. This was later modified to make the subject fall within
the concurrent authority of the state, so far, but so far only,
as the order of transmission and manner of delivery of interstate messages affected the conduct of the company within
the state. Thus the original sending of messages from a

u. s.
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cs 12 \Vall 20+
47 7 How. 283.
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state office or the delivery of interstate messages received at
an office within the state and addressed to a person there were
. matters of state control in the absence of federal regulation,
at least, so long as no onerous burden was placed upon the
company. So it was held in the Western Union Telegraph
Company v. James.n As the court said of the Georgia statute
in that case, "It can be fully carried out and obeyed without
in any manner affecting the conduct of the company with regard to the performance of its duties in other states." It
should be recognized that the regulation was more burdensome in the Indiana case than in the Georgia case. Yet in
neither case did the court find it unreasonable. Hence the
conclusion that there was a different principle applied is unavoidable. The James case was followed in every essential
respect by the case of the Western Union Telegraph Company
v. Commercial Milling Company5 2 though the Michigan statute involved there was a regulation of the liability of telegraph companies to the senders of messages sent out. of the
state.
4. But finally this principle of concurrent power of the
states over interstate messages was extended to cover the
regulation of conduct of the companies relative to the hand1ing of interstate messages beyond the boundaries of the state
where they were dispatched. Such was the effect of upholding the Virginia statute in Western· Union Telegraph
Company v. Crovo.53 Although that statute contained a
clause regulating the priority of delivery beyond the bounds
of the state of messages sent from within the state, as that
was not a point at issue the court refused to rule on the question, declaring that in any case this clause was separable from
the rest of the statute. But it did decide that the requirement that the telegraph company should deliver at points outside of the state messages sent from within the state "as
promptly as practicable" was a valid police regulation by Congress covering that subject.
Thus in the departure from the rule of the Pe11dleton case that
this subject is one requiring uniformity of regulation and is exclusively given to authority of Congress, there is a gradual tendency
to make the departure more radical and incisive. First, the state
ISt
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law-directing the m.anm·r of delivery of.interstate messages addressed to persru:iS"within the state is upheld. Second, a state law fixing
the -liability of parties rnntracting for transmission of an interstate
message is upheld. And third, a ·State law prescribing the manner
of delivery of interstak nwssages at points outside of the state is
held valid. It must be n·mark1·d in connection with the last decision
that the required manner of cklivery was not onerous. '!'hough it
was expressly recogni?:ecl by Judg-1~ 1'1~CKHAll1 in the James case that
there was no attempt "to enforce tlw provisions of the state statute
beyond the limits of the state," that is the very thing that was sanctioned in the last, the Cro'llo case. Wlwrcas in the first case, it was
recognized that the statute could "he· fully carried out and obeyed
without in any manner affecting the conduct of the company with
regard to the performance of its duties in otlter states;" the decision in the Virginia case went upon the very point that the conduct
of the telegraph company in another state was not in accordance
with the laws of Virginia.
·
Nevertheless the important point is that in all these cases reservation has been made of the power of Congress to intervene and exercise a paramount authority whenever it deems uniform regulation
expedienj:. And in spite of the tendency of these late cases it is
hardly likely that the court will fail to apply the principle it recognized in the Texas case of the virtual identity in the power of Congress
over railrpads and telegraph lines.
The law involving express companies has had a somewhat later
and more uniform development. This was probably due to the
absence for a long time of attempts at vigorous state regulation.
It has been the experience of aff forms of regulation under the commerce power, practically without exception, that the federal power
has been exerted only after some experimenting with state regulation has revealed defects or shortcomings to which the national
regulation has been applied as a remedy. This has been true of the
regulation of express companies also. The first really important
case was that of Crutcher v. K.enttecky 54 decided in 189r. The court
held unconstitutional a statute requiring that all foreign express companies desiring to do business within the state should obtain a license
to which a small fee was attached and should otherwise fulfill certain conditions. This decision manifestly advanced a step beyond
the doctrine upheld in a long line of cases5 G that a state cannot tax
51 I4I U. 5. 47•
.. Brown v • •~faryland, 12 Wheat 419; Railroads Gross Receipts Casc,· 1·5-\Vall• .284;
Te:ras Telegraph Case, ios U. S. 460; Roblrins v. Shelby Cou11t_,., i~o U. S. 4&9; Li:Loup
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"interstate commerce in ~y form, whether by way of duties laid on
the transportation* * *, or on the receipts* * * , or .on the occupation or business of carrying it on."G 6
The purpose which the state intend~d to effectuate by this law was
clearly to safeguard the interests of creditors and those who having
dealings \Vith express companies might be residents within the state.
It was not so much a taxation measure as a measure making for the
security of the commerce and industry in which its citizens might be
involved. Nevertheless it was not a local police measure within the
meaning of the decisions in New v. M£Jne5 1 or Smith v. Alabama.ss
Thus the court declared: "This (law) of course embraces interstate
business as well as business confined wholly within the state * * *
If the subject was one which appertained to the jurisdiction of the
state legislature, it may be that the requirements and conditions of
doing business entirely within the state should be promotive of the
public good. It is clear, however, that it would be a regulation of
interstate commerce in its application to corporations or associations
engaged in that business, and that is a subject which belongs to the
jurisdiction of the national and not the state legislature. Congress
would undoubtedly have the right to exact from associations of that
kind auy guarantees it might deem necessary for the pitblic security
and the faithful tra.nsaction of business ;~ and as it is within the
_province of Congress it is to be presumed that Congress has done or
will do all that is necessary and proper in that regard. * * * To carry
011 bzterstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by
the state; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is
entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States ; and the accession of mere corporate facilities, as a matter of
convenience in carrying on their business cannot have the effect of
depriving them of such right, unless Congress should see fit to interpose some contrary regu.lation."60
Such a paragraph has very strong implications. The parts italicized would seem to make direct admission of the power in Congress
to declare the rule of stockholders' liability, and to determine under
what conditions the franchise to transact interstate commerce shall
be exercised. Nevertheless it should not be overlooked that there is
0

,.. Mobile, I27 U. $. 640; Welton v. Misso11ri, 91 U. S. 275; Stockard v. Morgan, 185
U. S. 31; State Freight Tax, 15 Wall 232;_Pickard v. Pullman Co., n7 U. S. 34; Wali·
ing v. Michigan, n6 U. S. 446; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104; Western Union T.
Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. I.
,
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nowhere any intimation of the sovereign power to create corporations which may engage in interstate commerce. It is only by analogy and inference, however clear and strong that analogy and inference, that we may get from these .senfenJ:es: a concession that Congress has the constitutional power to pass an.e..~.clusive federal incorporation law.
Subsequently in the important ruling of Adams Express Company
v. Ohio61 there was established a taxation doctrine which, while
theoretically it appears to conserve the powers of the states in practice has not been permitted to affect the ·relative authority of the
state and federal governments over these instruments of interstate
commerce. An Ohio statute of 1893 provided that such a proportion of the total assets of every express company as its gross receipts
in Ohio bore t<? the gross receipts· from all its business should be
subject to the property tax of Ohio. The majority of the court took
the view that such a measure was a tax on property and not on receipts and thus was not a direct burden on interstate commerce and
could not be used as a means to its regulation. The rule announced62
by the court may be taken as the accepted general rule today63 and a
proper constructiorr of Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansa.s'* and Sou,thern Railway Company v. Greene65 will prove them
not to be exceptions. But these two cases do nevertheless modify
the doctrine in the sense of restricting its logical extension. It involves very clearly an application of the economic theory of income
capitalization as value detenninator. And this results, as was recognizea by the majority of the court in the two cases last mentioned
and by the minority of the court in the Ohio case, whether exercised
in the form of·business licensing or property taxation in nothing less
than a tax upon the profits of interstate commerce. It is a limitation
placed by a state upon the franchise to engage in interstate business ;
but it is now settled that where such measures operate as a distinct
burden upon interstate commerce they will not be sustained. In any
n 165 U. S. 1g+
a "Although the transportation of the subjects of interstate commerce or the re·

ceipts received- therefrom, or the occupation or busine5S of earrying it on cannot be
directly subjected to state taxation, yet property belonging to corporations• • • engaged
in such commerce may be; and whatever the particular form of the e.'<action, if it is
essentially only property taxation it will not be considered as falling within the inhibi·
tion of the Constitution".
~The doctrine w315 previously laid down in W. U. Telegrap/s Co. v. ];[ass., 125 U. S.
530; Pullman Co. v. Pe11na., 141 · U. S. 18, and in Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S.
688. It is followed in form if not in substance in N. Y. v. Roberts, 17I U. S. 658;
Resmann Bre-.uing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445, and Adoms Erp. Co. v. N. Y., 232
U. S. I4°'216 U.S. 1 •
.. 216
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event, doctrines formulated respecting the law of taxation have only
a very restricted bearing in other fields of action, e. g., commerce
regulations.
The first step in the positive regulation of express companies by
Congress was to govern their relations to shippers. The application
of this law formed the basis of contention in Adams £%press Company v. Croninger6 6 decided in i912. The shipper's receipt limited
the liability of the express company to $so.oo in accordance with the
published tariff which proyided graduated rates according to the
value of shipments. The law of the jurisdiction did not permit carriers to contract away any of their liability for the delivery of shipments. By the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of 19o6,
Congress had declared that the rules of liability should be uniform
on all interstate shipments and had.provided that the carrier "should
be liable for any loss*** or injury to such property caused by it,"
and furthermore that "no contract * * * should exempt such carrier
* * * from the liability hereby imposed." The court held that the
tariff of the company was not inconsistent with this law, and that
the regulation of Congress superseded all state rules and -regulations.
The court said "that the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce among the ·states and with foreign natiolls compre;.
hends power. to regulate contracts between the shipper and· the carrier of an interstate shipment by defining the liability of the carrier
for loss, delay, injury, or damage to property, needs neither argument nor citation of authority."
·
It will be seen from the character of the regulation here in question that Congress has occupied at least partially the field of regu-·
lation marked out in tl:;ie Crutcher decision. If it may go thus far
unquestioned ("need neither argument nor citation of authority")
may it not go further when conditions in the judgment of Congress
demand it in protecting all parties who deal with these corporate
agencies of interstate commerce? A federal incorporation law, be it
remembered, would be designed to serve substantially the same end:
to safeguard the interests of not only those who confide their goods
to express companies for transmission but also those who entrust
their funds to such corporations for investment.
[To BE CONTINUED]
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